Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci is professor of law and economics and a fellow of the Tinbergen Institute.
A Columbia Law School graduate, professor Dari-Mattiacci started his career at the University of Amsterdam in 2004 as the co-director and then director of the Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics. He joined the University of Amsterdam again in the fall of 2020 after a time at Columbia Law School where he was the Alfred W. Bressler Professor of Law.
He holds degrees in law (D.Jur. University of Rome “La Sapienza”, LL.M. and J.S.D. Columbia Law School), law & economics (LL.M. and Ph.D. Utrecht University) and mathematics (B.A. University of Amsterdam). He is a leading scholar working at the intersection of law, economics, and history. His recent scholarship has focused on the evolution of legal institutions and business organizations, the interplay of contract and property institutions, and the enforcement of regulations. He has held visiting appointments at George Mason University, the University of Chicago, Columbia University, and New York University. In 2018-2020 he served as president of the European Association of Law & Economics.
He has received several prizes and grants, including the ALEA prize for the most outstanding paper published in the American Law & Economics Review in 2014 and the Oliver E. Williamson Prize for best article published in the Journal of Law, Economics & Organization in 2017.
Professor Dari-Mattiacci has published numerous articles on the law and economics of torts, property, litigation, and lawmaking in various journals including the University of Chicago Law Review, the Journal of Legal Studies, the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, the Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, the Journal of Law & Economics, the Journal of Economic History, and the Review of Economics and Statistics. He is also the editor of a two-voluime book on Roman Law & Economics (with Dennis Kehoe), published by Oxford University Press.
His current research projects include the theory and historical emergence of business organizations, the network structure of codes and constitutions, the economics of shareholder lawsuits, standard form and relational contracts, carrots versus sticks, and the relationship between law and morality.